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Abstract
We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest
in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low–cost service is sufficient
or whether a high–cost treatment is required to solve the consumer’s problem. This
involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and signals are not observable. Treat-
ments are contractible, but success or failure of the low–cost treatment is observed only
by the consumer. Payments can therefore not depend on the objective outcome but only
the consumer’s report, or subjective evaluation. A failure of the low–cost treatment de-
lays the solution of the consumer’s problem by the high–cost treatment to a second
period. We show that the first–best solution can always be implemented if the parties’
discount rate is zero; an increase in the discount rate reduces the range of parameter
combinations for which the first–best can be obtained. In an extension we show that
the first–best is also always implementable if diagnosis and treatment can be separated
by contracting with two different agents.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyses contracting between a consumer (or principal) and an expert (or agent)
in the presence of two incentive problems. First, there is a moral hazard problem. The con-
sumer relies on the expert’s advice in order to choose one of two services (or treatments).
He can, however, not observe whether the expert exerted diagnostic effort and if so which
signal he obtained. Second, there is a problem of subjective evaluation. As success and failure
are only observed by the consumer and not publicly verified, payments for treatments can
only rely on the principal’s subjective evaluation, which might be misrepresented. In this
paper we analyse the optimal design of contracts in such a situation and provide conditions
under which the first–best can be reached.
The environment considered is the by now standard credence good problem.1 In such
a situation there is an important information asymmetry between the consumer and the
expert. Even if the consumer can determine which service he received, he does not know
whether he really needed an expensive high quality service or whether a less costly service
of lower quality would have been sufficient. Consequently, incentives for opportunistic
behaviour arise, because a self-interested expert who also provides the service might give
inappropriate advice and remain undetected. Two types of inefficiencies can appear. On
one hand, the quality of the treatment can be too low and not solve the principal’s problem;
we refer to this as undertreatment. On the other hand, overtreatment might occur, because
when only low quality is needed, high quality is not valued higher than low quality.
These inefficiencies have potentially important implications. As many other countries,
over recent years the U.S. experienced large increases in health care spending that many
think are unsustainable. Dr. Donald M. Berwick, a former administrator of the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, listed overtreatment as one of the key reasons for ‘waste’
in health care, saying that: “Much is done that does not help patients at all, and many
physicians know it.”2 In fact, in Berwick and Hackbarth (2012, p. 1514) he writes that
1The concept of credence goods was introduced by Darby and Karni (1973). Unlike experience goods,
a credence good has important properties that the consumer cannot detect even after consumption. Classi-
cal examples include medical and legal advice, a variety of repair services, real estate services or taxi ser-
vices. More recent applications of the concept of credence goods include consumer markets for food (Caswell
and Mojduszka (1996), Giannakas (2002)), the environmental and social impact of production (Feddersen
and Gilligan (2001), Baron (2011)), technologically advanced consumption goods with many options (Dul-
leck and Kerschbamer (2009)), the newspaper industry (Gabszewicz and Resende (2012)), auditing services
(Causholli et al. (2013), Knechel (2013)), financial services (Brown and Minor (2013)), and contracting for
infrastructure projects (Dulleck et al. (2013)).
2See e.g. Robert Pear, “Health Official Takes Parting Shot at ‘Waste’,” The New York Times 3, December
2011. For a discussion of the conceptual difficulties in identifying wasteful health care spending see Fuchs
(2009). The ABIM Foundation (established by the American Board of Internal Medicine, an organization
certifying physicians specializing in internal medicine) has started the initiative Choosing Wisely that aims to
1
overtreatment is “the waste that comes from subjecting patients to care that, according to
sound science and the patients’ own preferences, cannot possibly help them—care rooted
in outmoded habits, supply-driven behaviors, and ignoring science. Examples include ex-
cessive use of antibiotics, use of surgery when watchful waiting is better, and unwanted
intensive care at the end of life for patients who prefer hospice and home care. We estimate
that this category represented between $ 158 billion and $ 226 billion in wasteful spending
in 2011.”3
It is well known that in the credence good problem the first–best can be reached, pro-
vided the expert can determine the agent’s type of problem without incurring any cost to
himself (Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006)). In order to do so the contract has to establish
equal markup payments, which make the expert indifferent between treatments. Unequal
markups would bias the expert towards one alternative, precluding truthful reporting. We
depart from this credence good setting in three ways.
First, we depart from much of the credence goods literature by endowing the expert
with a potentially less efficient diagnosis technology. First of all, we suppose that becoming
informed requires exerting costly diagnosis effort. This creates a moral hazard problem,
because whether effort has been exerted and if so which information has been obtained is
not observable. As a result, equal markup contracts no longer provide effort incentives. The
reason is that the expert gains the markup if he chooses based on prior information, while
this markup is reduced by the effort cost when he exerts diagnostic effort. Moreover, we
allow the expert’s signal to be noisy. Under- and overtreatment might thus occur, even if
the expert invests in information and reports it truthfully, as his signal is not always correct.
Second, we allow for sequential treatments. Usually, the game ends when the consumer
experiences undertreatment. In reality, however, the interaction between the consumer and
the expert is unlikely to end if the consumer’s problem is not solved. A patient, for instance,
whose health problem persists after a non-invasive intervention (say acupuncture) might
well revisit the expert and ask for a surgical procedure. We assume that after the low-cost
treatment failed, the principal’s problem may be solved by applying the high-cost treatment
in a second period. Undertreatment causes therefore two types of costs. On one hand, the
first period low–cost treatment is wasteful, and, on the other, it delays the solution of the
principal’s problem. We measure this delay cost by 1− δ, where δ is the parties’ common
discount factor. When the discount rate is large (and δ low), undertreatment involves
substantial delay cost, and in the extreme we recover the standard setting considered in
reduce overuse of tests and procedures, see www.choosingwisely.org, accessed on 23/07/2014.
3Kale et al. (2011) look at that the top 5 overused clinical activities across 3 primary care specialties
(pediatrics, internal medicine, and family medicine) and report that these activities are common in primary
care although they provide little benefit to patients. They conclude that the associated costs of these activities
exceed $ 5 billion.
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the survey by Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006). Decreasing the discount rate, the other
extreme is eventually reached, in which the discount rate is zero (and δ = 1) so that
undertreatment involves no delay cost at all.4
Third, we connect the credence good problem to the literature on contracting with sub-
jective evaluation. As already mentioned, we assume that treatment choices are verifiable
and contractible. This assumption is likely to hold when the consumer needs no specific
expertise to identify treatments, as in the aforementioned examples of acupunctures and
surgical procedures (when informed consent must be given).5 In addition, we suppose
that - even though the consumer might be able to observe the outcome of treatment as
private information - it is impossible to verify treatment success in court.6 As already men-
tioned, however, the interaction between the consumer and the expert is unlikely to end if
the consumer experiences undertreatment. We therefore assume that undertreatment can
have consequences for the agent. More precisely, we assume that payments for the low-
cost treatment can be made contingent on the principal’s subjective report of the outcome,
that is, on whether he reports success or failure. Since this report might potentially be
misrepresented, a problem of subjective evaluation arises.
We analyse whether the principal can choose the payments for treatments in such a
way that delegating the choice of treatment to the agent avoids both the moral hazard
problem and the problem of subjective evaluation.7 The motivation for this approach is the
following. In our model treatments are contractible. Following the Revelation Principle,
the contracting problem can then be stated as a direct mechanism design problem. Con-
sequently, it is optimal to specify contract terms depending on the expert’s reports, subject
4Liu and Ma (2013) provide a model of medical treatment decisions with treatments potentially applied in
sequence. To the best of our knowledge only Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2009) consider a model of credence
goods and allow for sequential treatments. Both papers consider only the extreme case in which the discount
rate is zero. This precludes delay costs, which - as we will see - play an important role in our setting.
5Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006, p. 16) write that “The verifiability assumption is likely to be satisfied
in important credence goods markets, including dental services, automobile and equipment repair, and pest
control. For more sophisticated repairs, where the customer is usually not physically present during the treat-
ment, verifiability is often secured indirectly through the provision of ex post evidence. In the automobile
repair market, for instance, it is quite common that broken parts are handed over to the customer to sub-
stantiate the claim that replacement, and not only repair, has been performed. Similarly, in the historic car
restoration market the type of treatment is usually documented step by step in pictures.” See also Dulleck
and Kerschbamer’s discussion on p. 31.
6This difficulty has been recognized in the literature. Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006, p. 32) write that
“. . . treatment success is often impossible or very costly to measure for a court, while still being observed by
the consumer (how can one prove the presence/absence of pain, for instance). In such a situation, a patient
may misreport treatment success . . . ”.
7There is evidence that financial incentives affect professional recommendations, including studies on
health services (e.g. Donaldson and Gerard (1989), Henning-Schmidt et al. (2011), Clemens and Gottlieb
(2014)) and financial services (e.g. Mullainathan et al. (2012), Brown and Minor (2013)).
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to the requirement that it must be incentive compatible for him to reveal his information
truthfully. Therefore, it is also optimal to delegate the choice of treatment to the expert.
A second feature of our approach is similar to Liu and Ma (2013) in that contractual pay-
ments are specified over the entire diagnosis and treatment relation. This specification
allows the payment for the high-cost treatment in the second period (after failure of the
low-cost treatment) to differ from the payment for using high-cost treatment directly in the
first period.
Our main result highlights the importance of delay costs. If the discount rate is zero
(and δ = 1) so that undertreatment involves no delay cost, then the first–best is always im-
plementable by a contract. If, however, the discount rate is positive (and δ < 1), then the
first–best is still implementable when effort costs are low in combination with a relatively
informative prior. For other parameter combinations, however, only a second–best outcome
is implementable. The intuition for this result is based on the interplay of the problems of
moral hazard and subjective evaluation. On the one hand, avoiding the former and endow-
ing the expert with efficient information acquisition incentives requires that his reward in
the event of failure of the low–cost treatment should be small enough in order to reflect de-
lay cost. On the other hand, if payments after failure are too low, then the principal has no
incentive to reveal the success of the low-cost treatment truthfully and the latter problem
cannot be avoided. Consequently, the conflict between the requirements grows with delay
costs and the requirements can only be reconciled when these costs vanish.
We turn then to an extension of our model in which it is possible to separate diagno-
sis and treatment. This is a reasonable assumption in situations in which diagnosis and
treatment are to a large extent two independent procedures. For example, prescribing and
vending of drugs are independent activities and can therefore be carried out by different
agents (doctors and pharmacies). In other situations, however, such a separation is not
reasonable, as when treatment is more or less a by-product of diagnosis (like some surgical
procedures).8 We show that when separation is possible, then the first–best is always im-
plementable. The intuition is that separate payments for diagnosis and treatment allow for
more flexibility to cope with the joint problems of moral hazard and subjective evaluation.
The trade-off between both problems can be solved in the following way. In the event of
8Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) provide further examples for situations in which separation is likely to
be feasible and when it is not. Emons (1997) relates the feasibility of separation to the existence of economies
of scope between diagnosis and treatment, while Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003) propose a formalization
that is based on whether a recommendation identifies uniquely the service to be performed. Separation has
already been discussed by Darby and Karni (1973) as a solution to the problem of fraud by experts, because
an expert has only an incentive to recommend unnecessary treatment if he also provides it. As observed by
Wolinsky (1993, p. 387), “Such arrangements, however, would raise new problems regarding the proper
incentives for the diagnostician and hence might not be easily sustainable.” In our setting the expert must not
only be provided with incentives to give correct advice, but also to exert costly diagnostic effort in the first
place.
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failure, the agent making the diagnosis can receive a small payment so that information
acquisition is induced, while the agent providing the treatment receives a large amount
so that total payments to both agents are high enough to give the principal incentives for
truthful reporting.
Although our model is very stylized, it allows us to draw policy implications and pro-
vides novel explanations for existing institutions. It provides, for instance, novel support
for separation of diagnosis and treatment, complementing existing explanations for sepa-
ration. For example, in their discussions of separation between doctors and pharmacies.
Darby and Karni (1973) and Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006, p. 8) focus on the moral
hazard problem and argue that breaking up the joint provision of diagnosis and treat-
ment avoids overtreatment. In contrast, in our framework separation alleviates not only
the moral hazard problem but also the tension between this problem and the problem of
subjective evaluation.
Indeed, there is reason to believe that separation can contribute to avoid conflicts of in-
terest that may lead to over-utilization of treatments and result in large health care costs. In
the U.S. the so-called Stark Law governs physician self-referral for Medicare and Medicaid
patients, where self-referral is defined as “the practice of a physician referring a patient
to a medical facility in which he has a financial interest, be it ownership, investment, or
a structured compensation arrangement.”9 Intensity-modulated radiation therapy (IMRT),
a treatment for prostate cancer, is an exception from the general Medicare prohibition of
self-referral. A recent report to the U.S. Congress explains that several other less costly
and equally appropriate alternative treatments to IMRT are available. The report looked at
providers who began to self-refer to IMRT during the study. These providers increased the
percentage of prostate cancer patients referred for IMRT from 37% to 56% after they began
to self-refer. Moreover, during the period studied the number of IMRT services performed
by self-referring providers and its associated costs increased.10
Another implication of our efficiency result concerning separation contributes to the
discussion of the rise of chain stores and decline of local specialist businesses. Following
Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2009) we might interpret the credence good setting as a model
of technologically advanced consumption goods with many options, like personal comput-
ers or home cinema systems. Local specialist dealers of these goods are able to determine
the exact needs of a consumer and face competition from chain stores or discounters who
do not have this ability. Our efficiency result concerning separation of diagnosis and treat-
ment indicates a positive role for the existence of such discounters that to the best of our
knowledge has not been recognized in the literature.
Lastly, our model implies that when separation is not possible, contractual payments
9See www.starklaw.org, accessed on 23/07/2014.
10United States Government Accountability Office (2013).
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should be based on treatment protocols rather than treatments. More precisely, payments
for the low-cost treatment should not depend on the principal’s report but include a re-
imbursement for a potentially necessary high-cost treatment. Applied to remuneration in
health care this finding yields support for integrate payments. For instance, primary care
doctors might get a payment in advance and in return have to provide comprehensive
health care that might require to buy hospital care when needed.
Related Literature
The literature on credence goods focusses on the avoidance of fraud. Since the result
of diagnosis is unobserved, opportunistic advice might result in inappropriate treatment.
We follow a strand of the literature that assumes treatment decisions are observable. As
mentioned earlier, fraud might then occur when treatments have different markups, as the
expert might misrepresent the required treatment.11 A second strand of literature assumes
that the treatment provided is not observable. This gives rise to a different type of fraud,
in which the low-cost treatment is provided but misrepresented as a high-cost one.12 In
addition, a social loss from the problem remaining insufficiently treated may arise.13
These models assume that the expert is perfectly informed, without incurring any costs.
Consequently, they abstract from the moral hazard problem we consider.14 When such a
moral hazard problem is considered, equal markups no longer achieve the first–best and the
question how the credence good environment should be designed arises. The theoretical
literature considering this question is very small.15
Similar to us, Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003) assume that success and failure of treat-
ment are unobservable and unverifiable, but they do not consider the problem of subjec-
tive evaluation. In addition, the problem of overtreatment cannot appear, treatments are
11See Darby and Karni (1973), Emons (1997, 2001), De Jaegher and Jegers (2001), Frankel and Schwarz
(2014).
12See Darby and Karni (1973), Pitchik and Schotter (1987, 1993), Wolinsky (1993, 1995), Sülzle and
Wambach (2005), Alger and Salanié (2006), Hyndman and Ozerturk (2011).
13See Fong (2005) and Liu (2011).
14Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) review this literature in a unified model. Our model generalizes their
setting in the three dimensions explained above. The limiting case of our model when (i) the expert’s signal
is costless as well as perfectly precise; (ii) treatments cannot be applied in sequence (that is, the discount
factor δ vanishes); and (iii) contractual payments are restricted to depend only on the choice of treatment,
recovers the setting in Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) in which their assumptions H (Homogeneity), C
(Commitment), and V (Verifiability) hold and their Lemma 1 applies.
15Bonroy et al. (2013) also analyse a credence good problem and look at incentives for costly diagnostic
effort. The problem considered is different from ours, however, because effort is observable. The papers by
Demski and Sappington (1987) and Taylor (1995) consider different economic environments from ours and
investigate how incentives for costly diagnostic effort can be provided. As in the second strand of literature
mentioned above, in their models treatment decisions are unobservable.
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equally costly, and experts have no incentive to misrepresent the required treatment, once
it is diagnosed. This isolates the problem to provide incentives to invest in costly diag-
nostic effort, when contrary to us the diagnostic signal is assumed to be perfectly precise.
Pesendorfer and Wolinsky explore how competition between experts can allow consumers
to obtain multiple diagnoses and whether this competition can provide experts with effort
incentives. Their main result is that the equilibrium is inefficient. In contrast, we provide
conditions under which the first–best can be reached. In an extension, Pesendorfer and
Wolinsky (2003) also discuss briefly the case when it is possible to separate diagnosis and
treatment. Interestingly, they show that the outcome remains inefficient, while our exten-
sion to such a setting shows that the first–best is always implementable. In this sense, our
result emphasises the potential of multiple agents to specialize in diagnosis and treatment
rather than to compete with one another, as in Pesendorfer and Wolinsky.16
Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2009) investigate the incentives of experts to exert diagnostic
effort and to report truthfully when they face competition from chain stores or discounters.
Their analysis has thus a very different focus from ours. In their model, however, effort
is costly and treatments can be applied in sequence. The main modeling differences are
that in their setting the expert’s signal is perfectly precise, that there are no delay costs
and, most importantly, that success and failure of treatment are observable and verifiable.
A byproduct of their analysis is to describe contracts that provide effort incentives. This
is consistent with our result that the first–best can be achieved when there are no delay
costs. Our analysis goes beyond their result and shows that when failure is not verifiable
and delay costs are introduced, a tension between the problems of moral hazard and sub-
jective evaluation arises, so that the first–best can no longer be achieved for some parameter
combinations.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on subjective evaluation, which addresses
the problem of providing of effort incentives for the agent in situations where only the prin-
cipal privately observes some performance measure. This applies to our context because
the expert has to invest effort in identifying the appropriate treatment, and only the con-
sumer learns the outcome of the treatment. Some part of the literature studies subjective
evaluations in models of repeated interactions, where intertemporal incentives play a key
role.17 Our model is more closely related to MacLeod (2003), who like us considers a single
interaction between a principal and an agent. He shows that effort incentives can be cre-
ated only if the contract specifies some ex post inefficiencies that are formally equivalent to
‘money burning’, i.e. payments to a passive third party. In contrast, our analysis is confined
16Notice that this specialization result is different from (vertical) specialization results in the second strand
of literature mentioned above, in which treatment decisions are unobservable. In Wolinsky (1993) or Alger
and Salanié (2006) some experts provide only the minor treatment, while others specialize in the major
treatment.
17See e.g. Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994), Fuchs (2007), Levin (2003), Pearce and Stacchetti (1998).
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to budget balanced contracts and excludes third-party payments. Nonetheless, at least for
some range of parameter combinations, the agent can be incentivized to exert diagnosis
effort. The reason is that after failure of the first treatment, he can be contractually obliged
to perform a costly second treatment. This creates a possibility to punish the agent for
failure and so he can be induced to acquire information about the appropriate first period
treatment.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the credence goods prob-
lem and our assumptions on observability and contracts. In Section 3 we characterize the
first–best decision. Section 4 analyses optimal contracts and establishes our main result. In
Section 5 we extend our model to a situation in which it is possible to separate diagnosis
and treatment. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
2 The Model
The Credence Good Problem
Consider the by now standard credence good problem. An expert potentially knows more
about the quality of a good or service that a consumer needs than the uninformed consumer
himself.18 We also refer to the consumer as the principal and to the expert as the agent.
More precisely, the consumer needs one of two services (or treatments), depending on
his type. If the principal has the minor problem θL, then the low-cost treatment TL is
sufficient. The problem might, however, be important, denoted by θH . In this case the
high-cost treatment TH is needed, as the low-cost service does not help. This formalizes
one type of choice in health care that is often considered to lead to wasteful expenditures.
Discussing waste in health care, Fuchs (2009) gives the following example for a choice
between a high-cost procedure and a less expensive alternative: “high-cost drug-eluting
stents may be the better choice for some patients, but others would do just as well with less
expensive bare-metal stents” (p. 2481). Formally, the principal’s gross utility uP depends
on his type θ ∈ {θL,θH} and the treatment T ∈ {TL, TH} according to
uP(θ , T ) =
¨
0 if θ = θH and T = TL
v > 0 otherwise.
, (1)
We refer to the combination (θH , TL) as undertreatment: the consumer discovers ex post
that he has the major problem and that the service TL is insufficient. When the minor
problem is solved through the high-cost treatment in the combination (θL, TH), we speak of
overtreatment, as the low-cost service would have been sufficient.
18See the survey by Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006).
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The principal is uncertain as to which service is the correct one. But he knows the prior
probability
Prob(θL) = 1− Prob(θH) = q. (2)
The outside option of the principal is not to be treated at all, giving zero utility to both
principal and agent.
Also the expert a priori only knows (2). But he can acquire additional information about
the principal’s problem to identify the appropriate treatment. To do so he needs to exert
effort at a cost c ≥ 0, which enables him to privately observe a signal s ∈ {sL, sH} about the
principal’s problem θ . The signal is correct with probability σ, i.e.
Prob(sL|θL) = Prob(sH |θH) = σ, Prob(sL|θH) = Prob(sH |θL) = 1−σ, (3)
with σ > 1/2. If the agent exerts no effort, he incurs no cost but learns nothing. These
assumptions generalize the previous literature on credence goods which assumed either
c = 0 or σ = 1 or both. The effort cost c can also be interpreted as the opportunity costs
of time. Physicians often complain that changes in reimbursement oblige them to see more
patients per day, thereby making it more difficult to conduct proper diagnosis.19
Once the principal was treated in the first period and experienced undertreatment, in a
second period he can request the high-cost treatment, which will then solve his problem.
We introduce the discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1], in order to capture that the principal prefers
his problem to be solved in period 1 rather than in period 2. A special case is when δ = 0
and only one treatment can be applied. This might be because the treatment is urgent
(the principal is extremely impatient) or the first treatment is irreversible. As explained in
the literature review, the literature on credence goods focusses almost exclusively on the
case δ = 0 and is thus generalized through our model. For simplicity we assume that the
principal and the agent share a common discount factor.
Abusing notation we indicate also the treatment costs by TL and TH . Unless explicitly
stated otherwise, we assume that v > TH > TL ≥ 0, q ∈ (0,1), c > 0, δ > 0, and σ > 1/2.
The values of these parameters are common knowledge.
Observability and Contracts
We assume that the expert’s choice of treatment is observable. As mentioned in the Intro-
duction, this is likely to hold when no specific expertise is required to identify treatments.
Therefore, a contract can stipulate that he selects treatment TH for a payment pH in the
first period. Since it is commonly known that this solves the principal’s problem, under this
contract the principal–agent relation ends at the end of the first period.
19See e.g. Sandeep Jauhar, “Busy Doctors, Wasteful Spending,” The New York Times 20, July 2014.
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Also, a contract can specify that the agent selects treatment TL in the first period. We
assume, however, that success and failure are not publicly observable. The principal pri-
vately learns whether this treatment has been successful or not at the end of the first pe-
riod. Therefore, the payment for treatment TL can only depend on a subjective evaluation
R ∈ {S, F} of the principal, where S indicates “success" and F “failure". Thus, if the agent se-
lects treatment TL, he receives the payment pLS if the principal reports S and pLF otherwise.
This captures for example health problems for which it is difficult to measure treatment
success objectively. Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) mention the difficulty of proving the
absence of pain as an example. It is less appropriate when an objective test exists, like in
the case of cancer screening.
Since v > TH , a contract optimally entitles the principal to treatment TH in the second
period upon failure of treatment TL in the first period. Without loss of generality, there are
no additional payments for the second treatment. This means that the payment pLF is the
reimbursement for treatment TL in the first period and TH in the second period.
20 As the
principal can misreport a successful treatment, for completeness we also have to specify his
utility for the case where he demands TH even though his problem has been solved by TL in
the first period. We assume that in this case a second treatment in period 2 does not affect
the principal’s gross utility, i.e. his gross payoff remains v at the end of period 1.21
Finally, the principal may wish the agent to exert diagnosis effort before a treatment is
selected. Yet, in addition to the problem that success and failure of the low–cost treatment
are not publicly observable, this creates a moral hazard problem: neither the public nor
the principal observe whether the agent invests effort in information acquisition, and if so
which signal he observes. Therefore, if the principal prefers a costly diagnosis, he has to
delegate the choice of treatment to the expert and to choose the payments
p ≡ (pH , pLS, pLF) (4)
in such a way that they provide the incentive to acquire information about θ . Indeed, under
an optimal contract, the Revelation Principle requires the agent to report the observed
signal truthfully and the principal to commit himself to a treatment strategy contingent on
the agent’s report. In line with the Delegation Principle (see, e.g., Holmström (1984) and
Alonso and Matouschek (2008)) this is equivalent to a contract that delegates the choice of
treatment to the agent.
The contracting relation proceeds in the following stages:
20If the principal has to pay p′LF for the first and p′2 for the second treatment, this is equivalent to a single
payment pLF = p′LF +δp′2 after the first treatment.
21Constant gross utility is the conservative assumption to make, as if the principal’s gross utility were to
decline, incentives for misreporting were reduced. On the other hand, increasing gross utility is not in line
with the basic assumptions of the credence goods problem, in which the high-cost treatment does not yield
higher gross utility than the low-cost treatment given that both solve the problem.
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1. Nature determines the principal’s type θ ∈ {θL,θH}. Neither the principal nor the
agent observes the realization of θ . They both know only the a priori probabilities as
given by (2).
2. The principal signs a contract with the agent. This specifies some payments p. In
addition, the principal can either delegate the choice of treatment to the agent or
he can demand some first–period treatment T ∈ {TL, TH}. Our assumptions ensure
that a positive net surplus can be achieved by an appropriate contract, on which both
parties will agree.
3. If the treatment is already specified in the contract, the agent selects the mandated
treatment. Otherwise, if the choice of treatment is delegated, he decides about
whether or not to invest effort in information acquisition. After investing he pri-
vately observes a signal s, updates his prior beliefs according to (3), and then chooses
some first–period treatment T . The agent’s effort decision is not observable. Without
information acquisition the agent directly selects T without observing a signal.
4. After a first–period treatment TH the contracting relation ends and the principal pays
pH . If treatment TL has been selected, the principal privately observes whether his
problem has been solved. If he reports “success” he pays pLS and the relation ends; if
he reports “failure” he pays pLF and receives treatment TH in the second period.
Thus, the principal can either keep authority over the selection of treatment or he can
delegate the treatment decision to the agent. If he is confident that he can identify the
appropriate treatment, he can follow his judgement. Otherwise he has the opportunity of
letting the expert determine the treatment decision. This seems to be in line with patient
preferences. When the choice of the appropriate treatment is uncertain patients prefer to
delegate the final decision to their physician, rather than making the decision themselves.22
3 First–Best Treatment Strategies
Before analyzing the optimal contract between the principal and the agent, we consider
the first–best outcome. Suppose the principal is able to acquire information and to perform
the appropriate treatment with the same cost as the expert. Since the principal himself
effectively takes over the role of the expert, both the problem of subjective evaluation and
the moral hazard problem of investing effort then disappear. The principal maximizes the
overall surplus and the result is the first–best decision.




TL v− TL −TL +δ(v− TH)
TH v − TH v− TH
Table 1: Surplus net of treatment cost
As explained before, when treatment TL fails in period 1, it is optimal to choose TH in
the second period. Therefore, the different combinations of treatments T and types θ imply
the surplus net of treatment cost given in Table 1.
At the beginning of the first period the principal can either choose the treatment based
on prior information only or he can invest in information before making his choice. Thus
there are three possible treatment strategies. First, the principal can choose treatment TH
without acquiring information. This yields the net surplus
S∗H ≡ v− TH , (5)
because the treatment is always successful. Yet, with probability q it involves overtreat-
ment. Second, also based on prior information only, the principal can first try the low-cost
treatment and correct this choice later when needed. We call this the trial-&-error strategy.
It yields the net surplus
S∗T&E ≡ q(v− TL) + (1− q)
−TL +δ(v− TH) , (6)
because the problem is solved with the a priori probability q, whereas with probability
1−q it turns out that TL results in undertreatment so that the high-cost treatment becomes
necessary in period 2.
Finally, if the principal exerts effort in diagnosis and chooses treatment Ti upon observ-




σ(v − TL) + (1−σ)(v− TH) (7)
+(1− q)[σ(v− TH) + (1−σ)(−TL +δ(v− TH))]− c.
Indeed, with probability q the problem is minor and overtreatment occurs only if the signal
is incorrect. With probability 1− q the problem is major, and when the signal is incorrect
the treatment decision must be corrected later. These expected benefits are reduced by the
information cost c. More precise information is beneficial because
∂ S∗I /∂ σ = (1−δ)(1− q)(v− TH) + q(TH − TL) + (1− q)TL > 0. (8)
23It is easy to see that investing in diagnosis and then ignoring the information cannot be optimal. There-
fore, selecting Ti after signal si is optimal whenever information acquisition yields a higher expected surplus
than a decision based on prior information. The formal argument is analogous to the proof of Lemma 3 below
and is omitted here.
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In fact, when the signal becomes perfectly precise as σ → 1, the information acquisition
strategy reduces the likelihood of both overtreatment and undertreatment to zero.
From the payoffs in (5)–(7) we can now derive the first–best treatment strategy. If
treatment choice is based on prior information only, the trial-&-error strategy is at least as
good as choosing the high-cost treatment if S∗T&E ≥ S∗H , which is equivalent to
q ≥ q∗ ≡ (1−δ)(v− TH) + TL
(1−δ)(v − TH) + TH . (9)
Clearly, our assumptions imply that q∗ ∈ (0,1). Intuitively, the trial-&-error strategy is the
more attractive, the more the principal is concerned with overtreatment and the less he
cares about undertreatment.
Investing in information is optimal if it is at least as good as choosing any of the two
strategies based on prior information, i.e. if S∗I ≥ S∗H and S∗I ≥ S∗T&E. These two conditions
are satisfied if and only if
c ≤ cI(q) ≡ (TH − TL)q(2σ− 1) + 1−σ (10)
− (1−σ)(1− q)v(1−δ) +δTH
and
c ≤ cI I(q) ≡ (TH − TL)q(2σ− 1)−σ (11)
+σ(1− q)v(1−δ) +δTH .
Therefore, as long as
c ≤ c¯(q)≡min[cI(q), cI I(q)], (12)
the principal optimally invests in information acquisition before taking a treatment deci-
sion.
It is easily verified, that cI(·) and cI I(·) are linear in q with ∂ cI(q)/∂ q > 0 and
∂ cI I(q)/∂ q < 0. Further, for q∗ as defined in (9) we have
c¯(q∗) = cI(q∗) = cI I(q∗) =
(2σ− 1)(TH − TL)(1−δ)(v− TH) + TL)
v(1−δ) +δTH > 0. (13)
As illustrated in Figure 1, this implies that the critical level of information costs c¯(·) is
linearly increasing in q for q < q∗ and decreasing for q > q∗ so that c¯(·) is maximized by
q∗. Moreover, as c¯(q∗)> 0, by (12) information acquisition is the optimal strategy for some
interval Q(c) of q-values with q∗ in its interior whenever c ≤ c¯(q∗). As c decreases, Q(c)
expands so that information acquisition becomes attractive for a larger range of parameter
combinations.





c¯(q) = cI I(q)
I
H T&E
Figure 1: First–best treatment strategies
Proposition 1 The first–best solution has the following properties:
(a) If c ≥ c¯(q) and q ≤ q∗, it is optimal to choose the high-cost treatment without diagnosis.
(b) If c ≥ c¯(q) and q ≥ q∗, it is optimal to choose the trial-&-error strategy, i.e. the low-cost
treatment without diagnosis, followed by the high-cost treatment in case of failure.
(c) If c ≤ c¯(q), it is optimal to exert effort in diagnosis and choose the treatment contingent
on the information revealed.
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 1. Information acquisition constitutes the first–best strat-
egy in the gray shaded area. Outside this area, the first–best outcome requires the high–cost
treatment if q ≤ q∗ and the trial-&-error strategy otherwise. As can be seen from the shape
of the gray shaded area, the more diffuse the prior, the less is known about the success of
treatments and the higher the incentives for information acquisition. As the prior becomes
more precise, the risk of overtreatment with the high-cost treatment or of undertreatment
with the trial-&-error strategy declines, because ∂ cI(q)/∂ q > 0 and ∂ cI I(q)/∂ q < 0 respec-
tively. Indeed, when the prior becomes perfectly precise as q→ 0 or q→ 1, the treatment
decisions based on prior information entail no risk of over- or undertreatment and informa-
tion acquisition is not needed to take the correct treatment decision. Moreover, the overall
incentives to invest in information (measured e.g. by the altitude of the gray shaded tri-
angle) are the higher, the more important it is to avoid over- and undertreatment and the
more precise the signal is that can be acquired.
Before analysing optimal contracts under the informational assumptions of Section 2,
it may be useful to point out that despite the non–observability of diagnosis effort the
first–best treatment strategy can easily be implemented by a contract as long as success
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and failure of a treatment are publicly observable. Payments then can be made directly
contingent on the treatment outcome: If already the first–period treatment is successful,
the expert receives the payment p = v − k in period 1; otherwise the first period payment
is reduced to p = δv− k and the expert is contractually obliged to administer the high-cost
treatment in period 2. The parameter k is some constant that determines the division of
expected surplus between both parties.
With these payments, the agent’s expected profit net of expected treatment costs is S∗H−k
if he chooses the high cost treatment in period 1. If he adopts the trial-&-error strategy, he
gets S∗T&E−k; and if he invests in information before selecting the first–period treatment he
gets S∗I − k. Thus, by the above payments the agent becomes the residual claimant and he
will choose the treatment strategy that maximizes the first–best surplus.
4 Optimal Contracts
We now study the optimal contract between the consumer and the expert. Since both par-
ties are risk–neutral, they agree at the contracting stage to maximize their joint surplus.
To derive the optimal contract, we can therefore focus on contracts that maximize the net
surplus. Under our assumptions a positive net surplus can be achieved by an appropri-
ate contract, on which both parties will agree. The actual division of surplus depends on
market conditions and can by determined by some upfront payments or by adjusting the
payments p in (4) appropriately.24 If, for example, there are several competing experts and
the consumer has all the bargaining power at the contracting stage, he can appropriate the
entire joint net surplus in this way.
We first investigate the possibility of implementing the first–best outcome through a
contract. Trivially, this is possible for all parameter combinations described in part (a) of
Proposition 1, where the first–best solution is to choose the high–cost treatment without
prior diagnosis. In this situation the agent can simply be contractually obliged to select
treatment TH for a payment pH . The principal’s and the agent’s payoffs from such a contract
are
UH(p)≡ v− pH , VH(p)≡ pH − TH . (14)
The agent’s reimbursement can be set equal to pH = TH + k, where k is some constant that
can be adjusted to divide the joint surplus S∗H = UH(p) + VH(p) = v − TH . In the extreme
cases, if the principal has all the bargaining power, k = 0 and the agent’s net payoff is zero;
if the agent has all the bargaining power, k = v − TH and so the principal’s net payoff is
zero.
24As our analysis below shows, incentive effects depend only on payment differences for different treat-
ments. Therefore, the level of payments can be adjusted to reflect market power.
15
Next consider the case where the trial-&-error strategy is optimal in the first–best, i.e.
where part (b) of Proposition 1 applies. In this case contracting is slightly complicated by
the fact that the consumer privately observes success or failure of the first–period treat-
ment. Optimal contract design requires that he publicly reports his information (see My-
erson (1986)). Further, by the Revelation Principle (Myerson (1979)) there is no loss of
generality in considering only contracts under which reporting is truthful. The following
lemma describes the restrictions that the truthful reporting requirement imposes on the
payments p:
Lemma 1 The principal reports success and failure truthfully after treatment TL if and only if
pLF −δv ≤ pLS ≤ pLF . (15)
Proof: If treatment TL was successful, the principal’s payoff from truthful reporting at the
end of period 1 is v− pLS. If he reports F , he gets v− pLF . Therefore, the second inequality
in (15) ensures that he reports truthfully. If the treatment TL failed, the principal’s payoff
from reporting F is−pLF+δv and his payoff from reporting S is−pLS. By the first inequality
in (15), he therefore reports truthfully. Q.E.D.
Intuitively, reporting success must be cheaper for the principal than reporting failure.
The difference, however, cannot be larger than the gains from receiving the high-cost treat-
ment in the second period. Given that the condition for truthful reporting in (15) holds, at
the contracting stage the principal’s and the agent’s payoffs from the trial-&-error strategy
are
UT&E(p) ≡ q(v− pLS) + (1− q)(δv− pLF), (16)
VT&E(p) ≡ q(pLS − TL) + (1− q)(pLF − TL −δTH),
because with probability q the first–period treatment TL is successful and with probability
1− q it fails, requiring the high-cost treatment in period 2. For any p satisfying (15), the
contracting parties can achieve the first–best joint surplus S∗T&E = UT&E(p) + VT&E(p).
Obviously, it is not problematic to write a contract complying with the incentive–
compatibility constraint (15). Since the interval [pLF − δv, pLF] is non–empty, it is always
possible to choose a price pLS within this interval. In particular, consider a contract with
equal markup payments as in Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) so that the expert’s net
payoff is independent of treatment costs. Such a contract is defined by the property that
pH − TH = pLS − TL = pLF − (TL +δTH) = k, (17)
for some markup k that can be adjusted to determine the division of the joint surplus. As
v > TH > 0, it is easy to see that these payments satisfy (15). With equal markups the
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principal fully bears the cost of an additional treatment, and therefore he always reports
truthfully.
The following proposition summarizes our observations so far:
Proposition 2 Let c ≥ c¯(q), i.e. the first–best requires no investment in diagnosis. Then there
exists an optimal contract that implements the first–best solution.
We now turn to the more interesting and also more complicated case where the first–
best treatment strategy involves diagnosis effort by the expert, as in part (c) of Proposition
1. Implementing this strategy by a contract requires not only that the principal truthfully
reports the outcome of the low–cost treatment, but also that the agent is motivated to invest
c in information acquisition before choosing a treatment T . Consider a contract satisfying
(15) so that the first of these two requirements is fulfilled. Then, if the agent exerts effort
and chooses treatment Ti upon observing signal si, the expected payoffs of the principal
and the agent are25
UI(p) ≡ qσ(v− pLS) + (1−σ)(v− pH) (18)
+(1− q)[σ(v− pH) + (1−σ)(δv− pLF)],
VI(p) ≡ qσ(pLS − TL) + (1−σ)(pH − TH) (19)
+(1− q)σ(pH − TH) + (1−σ)(pLF − TL −δTH)− c,
and their joint surplus is S∗I = UI(p) + VI(p).
When the expert receives the authority to select a treatment, he will exert diagnosis
effort only if this gives him a higher payoff than selecting a treatment based on prior infor-
mation only. Thus the contractual payments have to satisfy the effort incentive constraint
VI(p)≥maxVH(p), VT&E(p) . (20)
This constraint is equivalent to requiring that p simultaneously solves
c ≤ cA(p, q) ≡ (TH − TL − pH)q(2σ− 1) + 1−σ (21)
− (1−σ)(1− q) δTH − pLF+ qσpLS
and
c ≤ cB(p, q) ≡ (TH − TL − pH)q(2σ− 1)−σ (22)
+σ(1− q) δTH − pLF− q(1−σ)pLS.
25It is easy to see that selecting Ti after signal si is optimal for the agent whenever (20) holds, because
investing c > 0 in diagnosis and then ignoring the information cannot be optimal. The formal argument is
analogous to the proof of Lemma 3 below and is omitted here.
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Therefore, condition (20) can also be written as
c ≤ c˜(p, q)≡min[cA(p, q), cB(p, q)]. (23)
In what follows we say that a treatment with diagnosis effort is implementable by a
contract with payments p if p satisfies both the principal’s truthful reporting requirement
(15) and the agent’s effort incentive constraint (20), or equivalently (23). The following
result characterizes the parameter combinations under which such a contract is feasible.
Proposition 3 There exist payments p that implement diagnosis effort by the expert if and
only if
c ≤ cˆ(q)≡ q(1− q)(2σ− 1)δTH . (24)
If this condition holds, then diagnosis effort is implementable in particular by the payments
pˆH = TH + k, pˆLS = pˆLF = TL + (1− q)δTH + k, (25)
for some constant k.
Proof: Let pˆ maximize c˜(p, q), as defined in (23), subject to the truthful reporting condition
(15). Then obviously, diagnosis effort is implementable if and only if c ≤ c˜(pˆ, q) = cˆ(q).
If cA(p, q) > cB(p, q) then c˜(p, q) = cB(p, q) is increasing in pH by (22) because
q(2σ − 1) − σ < 0. If cA(p, q) < cB(p, q) then c˜(p, q) = cA(p, q) is decreasing in pH
by (21) because q(2σ − 1) + 1 − σ > 0. Therefore, c˜(p, q) is maximized by pH if
cA(pH , pLS, pLF , q) = cB(pH , pLS, pLF , q). This yields
pˆH = TH

1−δ(1− q)− TL + qpLS + (1− q)pLF . (26)
Since
c˜(pˆH , pLS, pLF , q) = q(1− q)(2σ− 1)(δTH + pLS − pLF), (27)
is increasing in pLS and decreasing in pLF , it is maximized subject to (15) by setting pˆLF =
pˆLS. As c˜(pˆH , pˆLS, pˆLF , q) = q(1− q)(2σ− 1)δTH , this proves (24). Finally, we obtain from
(26) for pˆLF = pˆLS that
pˆH − pˆLS = pˆH − pˆLF = TH 1−δ(1− q)− TL, (28)
which is equivalent to (25). Q.E.D.
Since the principal reports truthfully and because TL additionally requires TH with prob-
ability 1− q in the next period, the prices pˆ in (25) can be interpreted as equal markups
on the expected treatment costs of choosing TH or TL before receiving information. This has
two implications. First, these payments make the principal indifferent between reporting
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success and failure after a successful low-cost treatment inducing hence truthful reporting,
as (15) holds. Second, they have the property that they equalize the agent’s payoffs from
treatment choices based on prior information alone, that is VT&E(pˆ) = VH(pˆ). Thus, once
the principal prefers information acquisition to one of the treatment choices based on prior
information, he also prefers it to the other and this happens whenever information acquisi-
tion is cheap enough so that (24) holds. For a given combination of q and c the prices pˆ are
not necessarily the only ones that implement effort. But they are chosen so that even for
the highest cost c = cˆ(q) effort is implemented. In other words, they maximize the range
of parameter combinations for which effort is induced.
For δ = 0 the payments in (25) become the equal markup payments in (17). But in this
special case cˆ(q) = 0 and hence effort is only implemented when it is costless. This raises
the important question whether equal markup payments can implement effort for δ > 0. As
we have seen above, the payments in (17) give the principal no incentive to misreport the
outcome of the low–cost treatment. Yet, as the following result shows, they fail to provide
incentives for the expert to invest in costly information.
Proposition 4 Equal markup payments, as defined in (17), implement a treatment with di-
agnosis effort if and only if information acquisition is costless, i.e. c = 0.
Proof: Since equal markup prices satisfy the truthful reporting constraint, it remains to
check whether they satisfy the agent’s effort constraint. Inserting the prices in (17) into
(21) and (22) yields cA(p, q) = cB(p, q) = 0. Therefore, they satisfy (23) if and only if c = 0.
Q.E.D.
The intuition for why equal markups do not induce information acquisition is closely
related to their virtue in the standard model (Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006)). In that
setting the diagnostic effort of the agent is costless and the only issue is to provide him with
the appropriate incentives to reveal his information. If markups are unequal and higher,
say, for the high-cost treatment, then the expert has an incentive to always recommend
this treatment, even if the low-cost treatment would have been sufficient. So the expert
has to be indifferent. But if he is indifferent gaining some markup k with each treatment,
then, by construction, both treatment choices based on prior information alone yield k and
information acquisition does not pay, because with such a strategy he also obtains k but has
to pay the cost of information c.
Under our assumptions we have c˜(q) > 0 for all q ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, for any q ∈ (0, 1)
diagnosis effort is implementable if c is sufficiently small. Diagnostic effort is easier to
implement (or equivalently c˜ is the higher), the higher the precision of information σ, the
more diffuse the prior and the larger the scope for combined treatments as measured by
δ. While the first two are roughly in line with the first–best outcome, the latter plays an
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important role. On one hand, we already mentioned that the extreme case of δ = 0 implies
cˆ(q) = 0 so that effort is only implementable when it is costless. On the other hand, as we
will see next, the other extreme of δ = 1 yields an efficiency result.
Proposition 5 If and only if δ = 1, diagnosis effort can be contractually implemented for all
parameter combinations for which it is optimal in the first–best. That is,
c, q|c ≤ c¯(q)	⊆ c, q|c ≤ cˆ(q)	
if and only if δ = 1.
Proof: From (9), (13) and (24) we obtain that
cˆ(q∗)− c¯(q∗) =−(1−δ)(2σ− 1)v(TH − TL)

(1−δ)(v− TH) + TL
v(1−δ) +δTH2 . (29)
Further, by (10,(11), and (24) we have
cˆ(0)− c¯(0) = cˆ(0)− cI(0) = (1−σ)(1−δ)(v− TH) + TL≥ 0, (30)
cˆ(1)− c¯(1) = cˆ(1)− cI I(1) = (1−σ)(TH − TL)≥ 0. (31)
Recall that c¯(·) is linearly increasing in q for q < q∗ and linearly decreasing for q > q∗ and
is thus maximized by q∗. The function cˆ(·) is strictly concave. For δ = 1, we have cˆ(q∗) =
c¯(q∗). This together with (30) and (31) implies that cˆ(q)≥ c¯(q) for all q ∈ [0,1]. Therefore,
for δ = 1 the first–best can be implemented by Proposition 3, whenever diagnosis effort is
optimal in the first–best.
For δ < 1, by (29) we have cˆ(q∗) < c¯(q∗). This implies that cˆ(q) < c¯(q) for some values
of q sufficiently close to q∗ and so diagnosis effort cannot be contractually implemented if
c ∈  cˆ(q), c¯(q), even though it is optimal in the first–best. Q.E.D.
The set of parameter combinations for which the first–best requires a treatment based
on information acquisition, but this is not implementable by a contract, is equal to
Z ≡ c, q|cˆ(q)< c < c¯(q)	 . (32)
By Proposition 5, this set is non–empty if and only if δ < 1. In Figure 2 the set Z is depicted
for this case by the gray shaded area. For a parameter combination in Z only a second–
best solution without diagnosis effort can be obtained by the contracting parties. From our
previous analysis it follows that the optimal contract then has the following properties:
Proposition 6 Let (c, q) ∈ Z . Then contractually implementing the high-cost treatment with-
out diagnosis is optimal if q ≤ q∗, and implementing the trial-&-error strategy without diag-








Figure 2: Non–implementability of first–best
In comparison with the first–best, the second–best solution involves a higher likelihood
of overtreatment for the high-cost treatment, and of undertreatment for the the trial-&-error
strategy. More precisely, the following efficiency losses arise
S∗I − S∗H = (1− q)σ((1−δ)(v− TH) + TL)− q(1−σ)(TH − TL)− c (33)
S∗I − S∗T&E = qσ(TH − TL)− (1− q)(1−σ)((1−δ)(v− TH) + TL)− c.
In both expressions, the first term indicates the gain from more precise information, allow-
ing to avoid overtreatment and undertreatment, respectively. The second term arises from
the fact that the signal is sometimes incorrect and following it leads to undertreatment and
overtreatment, respectively. Lastly, the diagnosis cost has to be taken into account.
5 Separation of Diagnosis and Treatment
Our analysis in the previous sections implicitly assumes that a single expert is responsible
for both diagnosis and treatment. We now show that the first–best outcome can be obtained
if separating diagnosis and treatment is feasible. As we indicate in the Introduction, this
is possible in situations where diagnosis and treatment are essentially independent proce-
dures with small economies of scope. To simplify our analysis, in this section we completely
abstract from any kind of interdependencies or economies of scope.
Suppose the consumer contracts with two different agents, a and b, for diagnosis and
treatment. Agent a is an expert for diagnosis and can acquire information about the prin-
cipal’s problem by investing the effort cost c; agent b incurs the cost T for providing treat-
ment T . After a diagnosis, agent a prescribes a treatment which is then executed by agent
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b. Otherwise, the sequence of events and the assumptions on observability are the same as
explained in Section 2. A contract specifies the payments
pa ≡ (paH , paLS, paLF), pb ≡ (pbH , pbLS, pbLF) (34)
each agent receives, contingent on the first period treatment and the principal’s report
about the outcome in case of treatment TL. As before, when the principal reports failure of
treatment TL, the payment p
b
LF includes agent b’s compensation for the additional treatment
TH in the second period. In total the principal now has to pay
pH ≡ paH + pbH , pLS ≡ paLS + pbLS, pLF ≡ paLF + pbLF . (35)
To ensure that he reports success and failure of the low–cost treatment truthfully, his total
payments have to satisfy condition (15).
After investing the diagnosis cost c and observing a signal s ∈ {sL, sH}, agent a’s posterior
belief that the principal has the minor problem θL is equal to
piL ≡ Prob(θL|sL) = 1− Prob(θH |sL) = σqσq + (1−σ)(1− q) , (36)
piH ≡ Prob(θL|sH) = 1− Prob(θH |sH) = (1−σ)q(1−σ)q +σ(1− q) ,
for signal sL and sH , respectively. Note that piL > piH as σ > 1/2. A contract optimally
delegates the choice of treatment to the diagnosis expert a. Thus, after the diagnosis agent
a informs agent b about the appropriate treatment.
Since the information obtained by diagnosis effort is not publicly observable, under an
optimal contract agent a should truthfully reveal the appropriate treatment that agent b
has to execute. The following lemma characterizes the payments pa that make prescribing
the appropriate treatment incentive compatible for agent a:
Lemma 2 Let (15) hold so that the principal reports success and failure truthfully after treat-






1−piH paLF ≤ paH ≤ piL paLS +  1−piL paLF . (37)
Proof: If agent a selects treatment TH after observing signal s, his payoff is simply p
a
H
because this treatment always succeeds. If instead he chooses TL, his expected payoff after




1−pii paLF , because the posterior probability of failure is
1−pii. Therefore, the first inequality in (37) ensures that choosing TH after sH is optimal,
and the second inequality that TL is optimal after sL. Q.E.D.
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Intuitively, the expected payments from prescribing the low-cost treatment must be
lower than the payments for the high-cost treatment when agent a believes that the lat-
ter is appropriate, and higher when he thinks the low-cost treatment is correct.
Finally, since agent a is employed as diagnosis expert, the contract has to ensure that
he invests the information cost c. By doing so he receives the ex ante expected payoff
V aI (p
a)≡ qσpaLS + (1−σ)paH+ (1− q)σpaH + (1−σ)paLF)− c. (38)
Note that the difference with VI(·) in (19) is that agent a does not incur any treatments
costs, because now agent b performs the treatment. When not investing in diagnosis, agent
a can either get the payoff V aH (p
a) by prescribing TH or V aT&E(p
a) by the trial-&-error strategy,
where
V aH (p
a)≡ paH , V aT&E(pa)≡ qpaLS + (1− q)paLF . (39)
Thus, the effort incentive constraint
V aI (p
a)≥maxV aH (pa), V aT&E(pa) (40)
implements diagnosis effort by agent a.
As the choice of treatment is verifiable, agent b can be contractually obliged to provide
the treatment prescribed by agent a. Therefore, there are no further incentive problems and
a treatment based on diagnosis effort is implemented by the payments (pa, pb) whenever
the constraints (15), (37), and (40) are satisfied. Actually, in what follows we can ignore
constraint (37) because the following lemma shows that it is redundant.
Lemma 3 Let the effort incentive constraint (40) hold. Then also the treatment incentive
constraint (37) is satisfied.
Proof: Solving the inequality V aI (p
a)≥ V aH (pa) for paH yields
paH ≤
σqpaLS + (1−σ)(1− q)paLF − c
σq + (1−σ)(1− q) . (41)
Since c ≥ 0, this implies that the second inequality in (37) holds. Solving the inequality
V aI (p
a)≥ V aT&E(pa) for paH yields
paH ≥
q(1−σ)paLS +σ(1− q)paLF + c
(1−σ)q +σ(1− q) . (42)
Since c ≥ 0, this implies that the first inequality in (37) holds. This proves that (40) implies
(37). Q.E.D.
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The intuition is simply that investing in costly diagnosis and then ignoring the infor-
mation cannot be optimal for agent a. In other words, if a contract specified payments
that induce information to be ignored, then it would not be optimal to invest in informa-
tion. By Lemma 3, finding payments so that (15) and (40) hold is sufficient to prove that a
treatment based on information acquisition can be implemented. The following proposition
shows that this is possible whenever this treatment strategy is first–best.
Proposition 7 Suppose a treatment based on information acquisition is optimal in the first–
best, i.e. c ≤ c¯(q). Then the first–best outcome can be contractually implemented by separating
diagnosis and treatment with the payments for diagnosis
paH = v− TH + ka, paLS = v− TL + ka, paLF = δ(v − TH)− TL + ka, (43)
to agent a, and for treatment
pbH = TH + k
b, pbLS = TL + k
b, pbLF = TL +δTH + (1−δ)v + kb (44)
to agent b, where ka and kb are some arbitrary constants.
Proof: From the definition of the first–best surplus of the different treatment strategies in
(5), (6), and (7) it immediately follows that agent a’s payoff in (38) and (39) satisfies
V aH (p
a) = S∗H + k
a, V aT&E(p
a) = S∗T&E + k
a, V aI (p
a) = S∗I + k
a. (45)
under the payments in (43). Therefore, whenever exerting diagnosis effort is optimal in the
first–best because S∗I ≥ max[S∗H , S∗T&E], then also agent a’s effort incentive constraint (40)
is fulfilled.
The principal’s payments in (43) and (44) to both agents sum up to
pH = pLS = pLF = v + k
a + kb. (46)
Therefore, (15) is satisfied. Q.E.D.
With the payments specified in Proposition 7 the three parties together obtain the joint
surplus S∗I , as in the first–best. At the contracting stage this surplus can be split in an
arbitrary way by adjusting the constants ka and kb according to market conditions or the
parties’ bargaining power.
To gain an intuition for the efficiency result, notice that agent b’s incentives can be
neglected, because he is contractually obliged to provide the required treatment. Key are
the incentives of agent a and the principal. On the one hand, agent a’s payments in (43)
give him a share of the first–best surplus and establish thus the correct incentives to invest
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in effort. On the other, the sum of the principal’s payments to the two agents does not
depend on the principal’s report and establish thus the correct incentives to report honestly.
Is separation of diagnosis and treatment required for this construction? To answer this
question consider the framework of Section 4 with a single agent and suppose that the
agent is paid following (46), that is pH = pLS = pLF . Clearly, the principal has no incentive
to misreport, as (15) is satisfied. Further, the critical cost levels in (21) and (22) can be
rewritten as
cA(p, q) = cI(q) + (1−σ)(1− q)(1−δ)v (47)
and
cB(p, q) = cI I(q)−σ(1− q)(1−δ)v. (48)
It is easy to see that if δ = 1, these payments establish the correct effort incentives for
implementing diagnosis.26 When δ < 1, however, it is no longer true that cA(p, q) = cI(q)
and cB(p, q) = cI I(q), implying that the effort incentive constraint is distorted. In contrast,
separation allows to preserve the correct incentives for agent a and the principal by paying
agent b an amount of (1− δ)v whenever the principal reports failure. Thus, the role of
the payments to agent b is to align the incentives of agent a and the principal, rather than
establishing incentives for agent b.
6 Concluding Remarks and Extensions
We have studied a credence good problem in which a consumer relies on the advise of an
expert in order to choose one of two services. In our model payments must be designed in
order to solve two problems. On one hand, diagnostic effort is costly and there is a moral
hazard problem when the expert chooses diagnostic effort. On the other hand, treatment
success is not publicly observable and payments must depend on the subjective evaluation
of the consumer. We find that such payments can be designed for some range of parame-
ter combinations. This range increases when the discount rate decreases and includes all
parameter combinations when the discount rate is zero.
We also show that the first–best is always attainable under the assumption that diag-
nosis and treatment can be separated at no additional cost. Of course, separation may be
inefficient and more costly than joint provision. There could be economies of scope in pro-
vision of diagnosis and treatment or there could be costs reflecting the consumer’s time lost
by consulting several experts.27 In this situation our analysis indicates that, if the discount
rate is positive, there a is a trade-off between diagnosis effort incentives and the additional
26Note that, as stated above, the payments in Proposition 5 are not unique.
27Darby and Karni (1973) footnote 5, Emons (1997, 2001).
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cost of separation. As the discount rate increases, separation becomes more attractive, be-
cause the set of parameter combinations for which under combined provision the first–best
can be reached shrinks.
Our model generalizes the information technology of the expert that the literature on
credence goods usually considers. Further generalizations of that technology are likely to
make it more difficult to implement the first–best when the expert provides both diagnosis
and treatment. However, our efficiency result when separation of both activities is possible
is likely to persist. The basic forces in our model are hence likely to be robust. Consider
for instance a setting in which the expert chooses the precision of the signal and the cost
of the signal is an increasing and convex function of its quality. The first–best requires that
the marginal benefit of higher precision – given by (8) – equals marginal cost and adds an
additional constraint that optimal contracts must fulfil. This may make it more difficult to
obtain the first–best under joint provision of diagnosis and treatment. When separation is
possible, however, the agent’s payments under the optimal contract differ from the first–
best surplus by an additive constant, and set therefore the right incentives.
We have argued that avoiding overtreatment is particularly important in health care, as
many countries have experienced large increases in health care spending. In this context
it may be reasonable to assume that physicians are to some degree altruistic and value
intrinsically providing high-quality care.28 In order to obtain an intuition into the effects
these concerns might generate, consider the setting in which the expert provides both diag-
nosis and treatment. Assume he values in his payoff function the patient’s health in some
small proportion. Notice that the physician always obtains this additional utility unless
the first-period treatment results in undertreatment, in which case this payment is delayed
to the next period. As a result treatment options become less attractive the more often
they involve undertreatment. In particular, when the likelihood of the minor problem is
sufficiently high, the range of parameter combinations for which investment in diagnosis
takes place increases as altruism becomes a more important concern. Although this might
indicate that with an altruistic expert the moral hazard problem and the problem of subjec-
tive evaluation become easier to solve simultaneously, these issues require a more complete
analysis. The reason is that whenever the signal is not perfectly precise, there is also (a
smaller) countervailing effect. When the likelihood of the minor problem is sufficiently
low, prescribing the high-cost treatment becomes preferred to investment in diagnosis, for
some parameter combinations. We leave a rigorous study of the optimal contract in the
presence of altruism for future research.
28See Green (2014), Liu and Ma (2013) or Henning-Schmidt et al. (2011).
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